The infringement of the right of reputation; specifically, the publishing of any matter concerning an individual which is untrue in fact, and which has a tendency to impair his public reputation. The right of every man to the good name which he has earned by a long course of good conduct is recognized by every developed system of law. It is regarded as a species of property, a valuable asset, of which no one can deprive him with immunity. Its violation is a legal wrong, or tort, and it may, under some circumstances be a public wrong or crime.

As reputation is the estimation in which a man is held by the community in which he lives, the gist of the injury lies in the publication of the imputation upon his character. If communicated to him privately or written out for the purpose of publication, but not actually communicated to a third party, it is no violation of the right of reputation, no matter how unjust it may be. Furthermore, the law will protect reputation only in so far as it is fairly earned. A truthful imputation upon character is no violation of the right. But even the publication of derogatory matter which is in fact untrue may not amount to defamation in the legal sense.

The imputation may be too vague and general, or too trivial to be regarded, or, although definite and harmful, it may be uttered under such circumstances of privilege as to justify and excuse it.

In general it may be said that an action will lie for defamation in those cases, and in those cases only: (1) In which the charge or accusation is shown to have caused special pecuniary damage to the plaintiff; (2) in which the plaintiff is charged with the commission of a crime; (3) in which the present existence of an offensive contagious disease is imputed to him; (4) in which the conduct of his profession or trade, or of an office of public trust held by him, or his fitness therefore, is impugned; (5) in which unchastity is imputed to a woman. In all these cases but the first, the words or acts charged are defamatory per se, and are actionable without proof of special damage resulting therefrom, and in all of them the action will lie whether the derogatory words were spoken or written. In the case of a written imputation, however, which is technically called a libel, special damage need never be shown, but it is enough to satisfy the jury that the words complained of were such as to bring the plaintiff into ridicule, odium, or contempt.

The most important and comprehensive ground of justification for imputations upon character is the privilege of fair criticism and comment on public men and affairs. This exists only in communities, like England and the United States, in which the government is of a free and popular character, and the liberty of the press and of public discussion has reached a high point. This privilege does not cover mere abuse, nor the malicious imputation of dishonesty and incapacity, nor the invasion of the private and domestic life of the person accused, unless this has some bearing on public affairs. But every citizen is protected in the honest expression of opinion, however severe and unjust it may be, concerning matters of public interest and general concern, whether political or not, so long as the limits of fair criticism are not exceeded. Privilege may also exist in matters of private concern, under special circumstances, as in comments on character made by a judge, advocate, or witness in the course of a judicial proceeding, such statements being privileged unless made maliciously or recklessly.

Reference has been made to the fact that the publication of defamatory matter may, under some circumstances, be a violation of the criminal law. This is never true of mere slander, or spoken defamation, but only of libel; and it is theoretically justified on the ground that written or printed attacks on character are likely to lead to breaches of the peace or to prove subversive of the good order and morals of the community. It seems more probable, however, that the criminal proceedings in libel cases are a survival of the primitive right of private vengeance for injuries of this character, which has, in process of time, been taken over by the State.