DEBT, ACTION OF
One of the old forms of personal
actions in common-law pleading,
being used, under that system,
to recover a sum certain, or
capable of being ascertained by
computation only. Formerly the
declaration alleged the debet ct
detinet, on the theory that the
defendant owed the money and was
guilty of an unjust detention of
the goods or whatever happened
to be the consideration, but
this fell into disuse and is no
longer proper.
Where the obligation is founded
on a simple contract the
declaration must allege the
consideration, and if on a
specialty or on a record it must
be set out in full. It differs
from assumpsit, where a special
promise is necessary. It is
still retained in some of the
United States where common-law
pleading is used, but has been
abolished by statute in England,
where it originated.
DECLARATION
Under the common-law practice,
the first pleading in an action,
consisting of a sufficient
statement, in legal form, of all
the material facts constituting
the plaintiff's cause of action,
together with a demand for
relief. The facts alleged must
be sufficient to give the
plaintiff a right to recover if
he establishes them; otherwise
the defendant may demur and get
judgment in his favor.
Originally, in England, it
applied only to personal
actions, the first pleading in
causes involving real property
being called a count; but this
distinction is no longer
maintained in England or the
United States.
The declaration is made up of
the following general parts,
viz. the title, being the name
of the court; the venue, or
county in which the cause of
action arose; the commencement,
containing the names of the
parties and the capacities in
which they are joined in the
action, together with a
statement that the defendant has
been summoned; the body, a
statement of the facts
constituting the cause of
action; and a conclusion, or
formal demand for relief at the
end. The body must conform to
the particular common form which
is adapted to the nature of the
action, but the general
characteristics remain the same.
It corresponds to a complaint in
code practice, and a bill in
equity or chancery, and
statement of claim in England.
DECLARATION or AFFIRMATION IN
LIEU OF AN OATH
A solemn statement in court or
before a judicial or legislative
body, by a witness, that he will
tell the whole truth in such
testimony as he may be called
upon to give in the matter
pending. Any one who objects to
taking an oath, for religious or
other reasons, may, in nearly
all jurisdictions today, thus
declare or affirm that he will
tell the truth, but usually an
oath is administered unless the
witness objects. This practice
was adopted generally because at
common law no witness who did
not believe in a Supreme Being
and who, therefore, had no sense
of the obligation of an oath
from that standpoint, was
allowed to testify, which rule
excluded much valuable
testimony. Violation of such
declaration or affirmation is
legal perjury and the witness
may be punished as if he had
taken an oath.
DEFAULT
In law, the failure of a party
to a suit to take the next step
in the process of litigation
incumbent upon him, within the
time limited by the practice of
the court. Originally, the term
was limited to the
non-appearance of a party in
court on the day assigned in the
writ or summons, but it is now
employed of a similar failure at
any stage of the cause. In
general, the effect of a default
on the part of the plaintiff is
to entitle the opposing party to
a non-suit, and the default of
the defendant renders him liable
to a judgment in accordance with
the demand of the declaration or
complaint. Formerly, in suits at
law, these results were final,
but the procedure of the equity
tribunals permitted the opening
of defaults for cause shown, and
this is now the general
practice, at law as well as in
equity, in the courts of England
and the United States. Usually,
however, the default can be
reopened and the cause
reinstated on the calendar of
the court only on the payment of
moderate costs by the party in
default. See PROCEDURE.
DEFENDANT
The person who is sued in action
at law or in equity. Blackstone
says, "In every court there must
be at least three constituent
parts, the actor, or plaintiff,
who complains of an injury done;
the reus, or defendant, who is
called upon to make satisfaction
for it; and the judex, or
judicial power, which is to
examine the truth of the fact,
to determine the law arising
upon that fact, and, if any
injury appears to have been
done, to ascertain, and, by its
officer, to apply the remedy" (3
Bl. Com. 25).
The term was originally limited
to the person sued in a personal
action at common law, the one
against whom a real action was
brought being described as "the
tenant," the complaining party
in that case being known as 'the
demandant', and these
expressions are still employed
to distinguish the contending
claimants to real property in
several of the United States.
But in most States, as well as
in England, the term defendant
has come to designate the party
used in any form of action and
in any court. See PARTIES.
DEMURRER
A pleading which in legal effect
admits the facts alleged by the
opposite party to be true for
the purpose of argument, but
denies that they are sufficient,
as a matter of law, to sustain
his claim; or which sets up that
there is some other defect on
the face of the pleading which
is a legal reason why the
plaintiff should not be allowed
to proceed under it. It is
always based solely upon what is
stated in the pleading to which
it is interposed, and cannot
contain any other defense.
Its purposes vary somewhat in
different jurisdictions; but,
generally, in addition to
denying that the facts alleged
constitute a cause of action, it
may be used to put in issue the
jurisdiction of the court, the
capacity of the plaintiff to
sue, that another action is
pending between the parties for
the same cause, that there is a
defect of parties plaintiff or
defendant, or that several
causes of action are improperly
joined in the same pleading. It
may be interposed to any
pleading of either plaintiff or
defendant which alleges 'new
matter', that is, something in
addition to what was set out in
the last previous pleading.
It is in the discretion of the
court to allow the party whose
pleading is thus attacked to
amend if the objection is well
taken and sustained, and great
liberality is shown by the
courts in this respect,
especially where the defect is
in some technical matter of form
and an amendment curing it would
not prejudice the opposite
party. On the other hand, if the
demurrer is overruled the
demurrant is usually allowed to
answer if he can convince the
court there is probable merit in
his proposed defense. These
privileges are usually granted
upon terms, as the imposition of
costs to date of the argument.
They have been abolished and
other proceedings designed to
accomplish like results
substituted in the King's Bench
and Chancery divisions of the
High Court in England, but are
retained and in constant use in
most of the United States, both
under the codes and the modified
common-law system of pleading.
See ANSWER; PLEADING.
DETINUE
A personal common-law action for
the recovery of specific goods
and chattels, wrongfully
detained from the claimant,
together with damages for their
detention and costs of the
action. The chattels must be
such as can be distinguished
from others; the action would
not lie where claimant's
property as wheat, was lawfully
mixed with other wheat so that
it could not be separated. The
action is not based on contract,
express or implied, but is for
the redress of a wrong. The
value of the chattel is always
alleged in the declaration, and
if the chattels have been
destroyed, or cannot be returned
for any reason, the plaintiff
may recover their value. It is
immaterial whether the defendant
came into possession of the
chattels lawfully or wrongfully.
It is sufficient if he has no
present right to retain them as
against the claimant. Thus, if
the defendant held goods as a
gratuitous bailee, his
possession would be lawful until
a demand was made by the proper
party for their return; but in
case of refusal to do so, the
claimant might maintain detinue,
as the detention would then be
unlawful. Demand before suit is
not necessary if the original
taking was wrongful. Possession
of the chattels cannot be
obtained until final judgment,
and in this respect it is not so
desirable as replevin where the
plaintiff gets immediate
possession. The plaintiff must
have a general or special
property or interest in the
chattels and a right to
immediate possession in order to
maintain the action. A judgment
for the plaintiff was formerly
enforced by a special form of
execution, called a writ of
distringas. This form of action
has been abolished in England,
but is retained in several of
the United States.
DICTUM
In legal parlance, an
unauthoritative expression of
opinion on a point of law
uttered by a judge in a judicial
proceeding. In a legal system
based, as is that of England and
America, largely upon precedent,
only so much of a judicial
opinion as is directly concerned
with the decision of the case in
hand has commanding authority.
This is due to the fact that the
courts have no power to decide
cases not before them for
adjudication. The principle of
stare decisis, that is, of
abiding by a rule once settled
by a formal decision, invests
such a decision with the force
of law, and makes it a binding
authority upon the courts in
similar cases. But a decision
upon a collateral point, or upon
a state of facts not before the
court for its determination, has
no such binding force. It is a
mere pronouncement, or
expression of opinion, which
derives its authority solely
from the learning and personal
weight of the judge declaring
it. It is usual, therefore, to
distinguish between the 'law of
a case' and the dicta, or
judicial opinions expressed in
it, which, however important and
influential they may be, have
not the force of law. This
process of 'sifting' the law
from the dicta of a judicial
opinion is one of the chief, as
it is one of the most difficult,
functions of the lawyer and the
judge.
It is not to be inferred,
however, that judicial dicta are
entirely without legal
authority. The opinions of
eminent and learned judges have
the same weight with the courts
as that which attaches to the
disinterested opinions of great
lawyers and legal writers, and
are classified as having
'persuasive' as distinguished
from 'imperative' authority. It
is often desirable and sometimes
necessary to resort to such
opinions as an aid to the
formation of a sound though
independent judgment upon a
question of law, and many cases
have been decided and many
important legal doctrines
established in deference to such
authority. In this view of the
matter, judicial dicta
constitutes a long and valuable
series of commentaries on the
law of the land, scattered
through the law reports, to
which resort may be had as to
the more systematic writings of
eminent lawyers and judges, as
those of Coke, Blackstone, Kent,
and Story. Wambaugh, The Study
of Cases (2d ed., Boston, 1894)
DISBARMENT
The act of depriving an
attorney, counselor at law,
solicitor, or barrister of his
rights and privileges as such.
The power to do this rests with
the courts, and they may take
this action, upon sufficient
cause, on complaint of any one,
or of their own motion, where
the cause comes to their
knowledge directly. It may be
exercised when an attorney has
been guilty of gross contempt of
court, dishonesty, extortion, or
professional misconduct of a
serious nature, and in some
jurisdictions where he becomes a
person of general bad character,
so that he cannot be considered
a fit person to be entrusted
with the legal business of
others. He must be given an
opportunity to be heard in his
own behalf, usually in open
court, and may cross-examine any
witness who may testify against
him, and produce witnesses in
his own favor, much as if he
were under indictment for a
crime. It is considered a severe
penalty, as it deprives the
person from earning a livelihood
by his profession, and is only
imposed in grave cases and after
a thorough investigation and
consideration. Where the conduct
has been culpable, but there is
reason to believe that it will
not be repeated, the court will
sometimes suspend the attorney
from practice for a definite
period, on the expiration of
which he resumes his former
rights and privileges. The court
may restore one who has been
disbarred to practice, in its
discretion, where proof is
presented that he will probably
conduct himself properly in the
future. See ATTORNEY.
DISCOVERY, BILL OF
An equitable remedy which is
sometimes used to enable a
plaintiff or defendant in an
action, either at law or in
equity, to obtain information
and proof as to facts and
documents necessary for the
prosecution or defense of his
case, where such means of proof
are within the knowledge or
possession of the opposite
party. The bill should not ask
for any relief as to the matters
in controversy, but may ask for
an injunction staying further
proceedings in the action until
the discovery is obtained. It
must only ask for the disclosure
of facts or the production of
deeds, writings, or other things
in which the party has a title
or interest, and which are
essential to be established in
order to sustain his side of the
case, and must show some merit
in his claim or defense. Thus a
devisee of real property under a
will might maintain such a bill
for the production of the title
deeds of the particular property
to which he has become entitled,
in order to trace the devisor's
interest, and consequently
enable him to establish his
claim. it must not demand any
information which is clearly
only in the nature of evidence
for the opposite party, as it is
not for the purpose of
compelling him to disclose the
manner in which he will endeavor
to establish his side of the
case. It will only be
entertained in civil actions. It
is still a common remedy in
States having distinctly
separate courts of law and
equity, but has been abolished
or has fallen into disuse in
States having codes of civil
procedure, as in New York, where
a party has a right to call his
adversary as a witness and
compel the production of books
and documents by subpoena duces
tecum. See EQUITY; EVIDENCE;
SUBPOENA.
DISTRICT ATTORNEY
In the United States, the public
prosecuting officer within a
defined district. The Federal
Government has one set of
district attorneys, and each
State has an entirely different
set for the same territory. The
former are appointed by the
President, and are in reality
deputies of the Attorney-General
of the United States, to whom
they are required to make report
of their official acts, and to
whose direction and control they
are subject. They are appointed
for the several districts into
which the United States are
divided for district courts, and
are charged with prosecuting
offenses against the Federal
Government, as well as with
conducting civil actions on
behalf of the Government, and in
some cases on behalf of
Government officers. As a rule
their compensation comes from
fees, and is not in the form of
a stated salary.
In most of the States a State
district attorney is elected in
each county, although his most
important duties, as a rule, are
discharged in prosecuting
criminals before the State
courts. He is also the
prosecuting officer before the
county court of the county in
which he is elected. He is
subject at times to the control
of the Attorney-General of the
State, and in New York is
removable by the Governor. In
certain contingencies he may
call upon the State
Attorney-General for assistance
in important criminal
prosecutions. His duties and
powers are regulated under the
provisions of the statutes in
accordance with which he is
appointed or elected. For these
consult the Federal and State
statutes.
DISTRINGAS
The name of a writ or process in
the nature of an attachment or
execution, taken from the
emphatic word of the writ
directed to the sheriff, viz.
"It is hereby commanded that you
distrain" the defendant, etc. It
was formerly issued in England
for a variety of purposes, such
as forcing a defendant who
neglected to appear to present
himself in court, or forcing a
corporation to obey a subpoena,
or compelling jurors to attend
court, or a defendant in an
action in detinue after judgment
to deliver the goods to the
plaintiff. The writ has been
abolished in England, as well as
in most of the United States,
although in Virginia it is
retained as a form of execution
in cases of detinue. See
EXECUTION.