Chapter V Pages: 56-62
At the beginning of the year
Congress realized that something
must be done immediately or the
disasters of the previous
campaign would be irretrievable.
It therefore granted a bounty in
the shape of $24 advanced pay to
every soldier enlisting, after
February 1st, for five years or
during the war, (31) its object
being "to complete the present
military establishment to the
full number authorized by law,
with the greatest possible
dispatch," (32)
The sixth section of this
act wisely rectified the most
glaring defect in the law of
1792 (33) by permitting militia
to enlist in the United States
Army. Nine days later,
apprehensive lest the
inducements already made would
fail to secure sufficient men,
Congress reverted to short
enlistments, and authorized the
President to increase the
Regular infantry by twenty
regiments, aggregating 57, 351
men, who were to be enlisted for
one year only. (34) The other
legislation during the year was
principally concerned with the
increase of the staff, which was
effected in the lower grades by
detailing officers from the
line. As usual, these measures
contained fundamental defects,
for the saving in staff
officers' pay was more than
counterbalanced by depriving
many of the companies and
battalions of their proper quota
of officers. (35)
In view of
the immense number of militia
employed in 1812 without
commensurate results, the
Government limited the army
under General Harrison to 7,000
men, (36) being driven to the
use of regulars by public
opinion clamoring for a more
vigorous and efficient
prosecution of the war. The
campaign, like that of the
preceding year, began
disastrously. The advanced-guard
of
the army, under General
Winchester, (37) moved forward
into Michigan in response to an
appeal from the settlers on the
River Raisin but was annihilated
by the British General proctor,
(38) the Kentucky militia
running away ignominiously. (39)
On February 1st, Winchester with
a new force of 2,000 started
back to the Miami and
constructed an entrenched post
at Fort Meigs, but was besieged
there (40) by Proctor, (41) who
routed a relieving force of
Kentucky militia under General
Clay (42) but was unable to take
the fort. As a matter of fact,
so heavy were the American
losses (43) that the prestige,
if not the actual fruits, of a
victory inured to the British.
(44) Again in July Proctor
appeared at Fort Meigs, left a
force of Indians under Tecumseh
to blockade the place and moved
against Fort Stephenson on the
lower Sandusky River. His
summons for surrender being
refused by Major Croghan, he
assaulted the fort (45) but met
with a repulse (46) and,
assembling his troops, retreated
to Canada for the third time.
Meanwhile additional militia had
been called out in Ohio and
Kentucky and had joined General
Harrison, who crossed Lake Erie
(47) with more than 7,000 men,
landed at Amherstburg on
September 27th, pursued Proctor,
overtook him and totally
defeated him at the battle of
the Thames (48) on October 5th.
(49) This success prompted the
Indians of the Northwest to
desert the British cause
forthwith and restored to the
Americans the territory lost.
The usual blunder was then
committed. Instead of the
victory being followed up, the
army was disbanded, the militia
and twelve months' volunteers
discharged, while General
Harrison took his 1,300 Regulars
by water from Detroit to
Buffalo.
"The cost of dispersing the 800
British regulars, who from the
first to last had made prisoners
of Hull's army at Detroit, let
loose the Northwestern Indians,
defeated and captured
Winchester's command at
Frenchtown, besieged the
Northwestern army at Fort Meigs,
and twice invaded Ohio, having
experienced but one rebuff at
the hands of a stripling in
command of 160 regulars at Fort
Stephenson, teaches a lesson
well worth the attention of any
statesman or financier.
"Not counting the hastily
organized and half-filled
regiments of regulars, sent to
the West, the records of the
Adjutant-General's Office show
that about 50,000 militia were
called out in 1812 and 1813,
from the States of Ohio,
Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and
Virginia, for service against
Proctor's command." (50)
"As further evidence that the
keys of the Treasury were turned
over to the States with no
check, save the honesty of the
officers who made out the
muster-rolls, it need only be
stated that up to April 14,
1813, 'no return of any
description' from General
Harrison's division of the Army
Had ever been received at the
Adjutant-General's Office. (51)
"The above facts would seem to
offer conclusive proof that THE
SAME MISTAKE IN STATESMANSHIP
WHICH, IN TIME OF PEACE, GIVES
US A NON EXPANSIVE MILITARY
ESTABLISHMENT, IS CERTAIN TO
BRING ABOUT, IN TIME OF WAR,
USELESS SACRIFICE OF HUMAN LIFE,
UNLIMITED WASTE OF MONEY, AND
NATIONAL HUMILIATION." (52)
Military Operations in the
Centre (53)
On April 27th a successful
attack was made on York, now
Toronto, followed by the capture
of Fort George by General
Dearborn just a month later, and
subsequently of all the forts on
the Niagara frontier. (54) On
May 29th the British under Sir
George Prevost (55) attacked the
garrison at Sackett's Harbor,
N.Y., (56) but were repulsed
with heavy loss (57) by the
Regulars under Colonel Backus,
while General Brown's militia
turned tail and ran, despite his
efforts. (58)
The retreat of Hampton and
Wilkinson from Canada to which
allusion will presently be made
compelled a withdrawal of the
regular garrison from Fort
George, the defense of which was
left to some New York militia
under General McClure. Upon the
approach of the British, this
inexperienced officer evacuated
the place on December 10th,
burned the village of Newark
(59) and retreated to the
American shore, his troops
mutinying en route. (60)
Although he called out all the
militia of the counties of
Genesee, Niagara and Chautauqua,
the British held these raw
levies in such contempt that
they determined upon a
counter-invasion, crossed the
Niagara River to Black Rock on
December 19th, captured Fort
Niagara "through the criminal
negligence of its commander, "
and, in revenge for the
destruction of Newark, burned
Buffalo, Lewistown and several
other places, (61) while the
militia ran away quite as fast
as did the inhabitants. (62)
Military operations in the
North.
Shameful as were the fiascos in
the central zone, they were
insignificant as compared with
the fate of the two columns
which undertook to invade Canada
from the northern frontier.
General Hampton with about 5,000
new-recruited regulars (63)
started from Lake Champlain,
crossed the border, was repulsed
at Chateauguay on October 26th
by a paltry force of 800
Canadian militia
and Indians, (64) and
ignominiously retreated to
Plattsburg. General Wilkinson,
with 8,000 regulars, (65)
assembled at the foot of Lake
Ontario and advanced down the
St. Lawrence. On November 11th,
his advanced-guard, composed of
about 1,700 men, encountered 800
British regulars at Chrystler's
Fields, and after a fight of two
hours, being unable to dislodge
the enemy and
having lost 338 men, it fell
back to its boats. A council of
war then decided to abandon the
attack on Montreal, the troops
retreated to the American shore
and went into winter quarters.
(66) In a word, two American
columns numbering fully 13,000
and composed for the most part
of regulars, faltered and
recoiled before an enemy of only
2,000!
"Want of cooperation,
superannuated and incompetent
commanders, newly enlisted and
undisciplined men, inexperienced
officers, all the fruits of a
bad military policy were the
causes of these humiliating
defeats.
"The story of Hampton's
nerveless campaign affords
perhaps the most satisfactory
demonstration of THE GREAT
IMPORTANCE OF, ONCE AND FOR ALL,
DOING AWAY WITH A MILITARY
SYSTEM WHICH, AS UNDER THE
CONFEDERATION, STILL BASED
ITSELF UPON THE SUPPORT AND
COOPERATION OF THE STATES." (67)
That Massachusetts and
Connecticut defied the United
States Government by refusing to
furnish their militia to its
service has already been seen.
(68) In Vermont Governor
Chittenden, being
bitterly opposed to the war,
sought to embarrass the
Government by a proclamation,
dated November 10, 1813, whereby
he commanded a brigade of
Vermont militia (69) to return
to their homes "within the
territorial limits of their own
brigade, there to repel if need
be, the enemy's invasion, either
in co-operation with troops of
the United States or separately,
as might be necessary,"
declaring "that, in his opinion,
the military strength and
resources of the State must be
reserved for its own defense and
protection exclusively." (70)
Some of the officers refused to
be parties to any such attempt
to produce insubordination and
mutiny, (71) but the governor
persisted in his stand and in
the following year went even to
greater lengths.
Military operations on the
Chesapeake.
After two declarations by the
British Government of a state of
blockade embracing the entire
Atlantic coast (72) with the
notable exception of
Massachusetts, New Hampshire and
Rhode Island (73), a fleet under
Admiral Cockburn entered the
Chesapeake on March 4th and,
being joined by Admiral Warren
and a force from Bermuda, spent
the next two months burning and
destroying towns. (74) The
inhabitants, to whom more than
66,000 militia afforded no
protection, (75) sought to
defend their property
themselves, but this disregard
for the rules of civilized
warfare entailed reprisals,
until the unhappy people were
glad to throw themselves on the
mercy of their enemies. In June,
Admiral Warren, who had gone
back to Bermuda, returned with
re-enforcements amounting to
2,650 infantry and marines,
attacked Norfolk (76) on the
20th and was repulsed, but
captured and destroyed Hampton
on the 25th. (77) The remainder
of the year the British devoted
to maintaining the blockade.
The Creek War.
On August 30th, one thousand
Creek warriors surprised Fort
Mims in southern Alabama and
massacred the garrison.
Tennessee promptly authorized
the raising of 3,500 volunteers
and, on October 11th, 2,500 were
concentrated at Huntsville under
General Andrew Jackson. A
Fortnight later he began his
march, and on November 3rd and
9th at Tallasahatchee and
Talladega he
inflicted crushing defeats upon
the Indians. (78) The war would
doubtless have come to a sudden
end but a dearth of supplies,
"due in large degree to the
failure of the Government to
properly organize the staff
departments, until hostilities
with Great Britain became
imminent " (79), forced Jackson
to withdraw to Fort Strother,
where he spent ten days in
argument with his hungry
and insubordinate troops. This
furnished a very amusing
incident; first, the militia
mutinied but were suppressed by
the volunteers, then the
volunteers revolted but were
brought to order by the militia,
with the aid of the guns.
Jackson, realizing that no good
could be derived from the
volunteers, permitted them to
return to Nashville, where they
were disbanded; but no sooner
was this difficulty overcome
than his militia, as well as the
2,000 under General Cocke sent
to re-enforce him, again became
disaffected and deserted him
almost to a man. (80)
Troops employed in 1813
Exclusive of rangers and
volunteers, (81) the troops
called out in that year amounted
to 149,148, only 19,036 being
regulars and the rest , 130,112
militia. (82) Of the latter
66,376 from Delaware, Maryland,
the District of Columbia,
Virginia and North Carolina
spent their time in observing
the 2,600 regulars and marines
on the British fleets, their
assistance to the despoiled
inhabitants or their resistance
to the enemy being virtually
nil. As Upton remarks, (83)
"The only compensation for the
employment of so many troops
during the campaign, was the
destruction of Proctor's force
of 800 regulars, a feat that
would have been impossible, bur
doe the victory of Commodore
Perry on Lake Erie."
Far from realizing the cherished
dream of a conquest of Canada,
the second year of this war
witnessed the expulsion of the
Americans from the enemy's
territory, followed by a
counter-invasion and the
destruction of the towns along
the entire Niagara frontier,
while farther south the British
plundered our coasts at will.
FOOTNOTES (31-83) ON CHAPTER
V THE CAMPAIGN OF 1813 Pages:
56-62
(Continue Page: 2)