The Military Unpreparedness of the U.S.: The Campaign Of 1813

 
 
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Chapter V Pages: 56-62

At the beginning of the year Congress realized that something must be done immediately or the disasters of the previous campaign would be irretrievable. It therefore granted a bounty in the shape of $24 advanced pay to every soldier enlisting, after February 1st, for five years or during the war, (31) its object being "to complete the present military establishment to the full number authorized by law, with the greatest possible dispatch," (32)

The sixth section of this act wisely rectified the most glaring defect in the law of 1792 (33) by permitting militia to enlist in the United States Army. Nine days later, apprehensive lest the inducements already made would fail to secure sufficient men, Congress reverted to short enlistments, and authorized the President to increase the Regular infantry by twenty regiments, aggregating 57, 351 men, who were to be enlisted for one year only. (34) The other legislation during the year was principally concerned with the increase of the staff, which was effected in the lower grades by detailing officers from the line. As usual, these measures contained fundamental defects, for the saving in staff officers' pay was more than counterbalanced by depriving many of the companies and battalions of their proper quota of officers. (35)

In view of the immense number of militia employed in 1812 without commensurate results, the Government limited the army under General Harrison to 7,000 men, (36) being driven to the use of regulars by public opinion clamoring for a more vigorous and efficient prosecution of the war. The campaign, like that of the preceding year, began disastrously. The advanced-guard of
the army, under General Winchester, (37) moved forward into Michigan in response to an appeal from the settlers on the River Raisin but was annihilated by the British General proctor, (38) the Kentucky militia running away ignominiously. (39) On February 1st, Winchester with a new force of 2,000 started back to the Miami and constructed an entrenched post at Fort Meigs, but was besieged there (40) by Proctor, (41) who routed a relieving force of Kentucky militia under General Clay (42) but was unable to take the fort. As a matter of fact, so heavy were the American losses (43) that the prestige, if not the actual fruits, of a victory inured to the British. (44) Again in July Proctor appeared at Fort Meigs, left a force of Indians under Tecumseh to blockade the place and moved against Fort Stephenson on the lower Sandusky River. His summons for surrender being refused by Major Croghan, he assaulted the fort (45) but met with a repulse (46) and, assembling his troops, retreated to Canada for the third time. Meanwhile additional militia had been called out in Ohio and Kentucky and had joined General Harrison, who crossed Lake Erie (47) with more than 7,000 men, landed at Amherstburg on September 27th, pursued Proctor, overtook him and totally defeated him at the battle of the Thames (48) on October 5th. (49) This success prompted the Indians of the Northwest to desert the British cause forthwith and restored to the Americans the territory lost. The usual blunder was then committed. Instead of the victory being followed up, the army was disbanded, the militia and twelve months' volunteers discharged, while General Harrison took his 1,300 Regulars
by water from Detroit to Buffalo.

"The cost of dispersing the 800 British regulars, who from the first to last had made prisoners of Hull's army at Detroit, let loose the Northwestern Indians, defeated and captured Winchester's command at Frenchtown, besieged the Northwestern army at Fort Meigs, and twice invaded Ohio, having experienced but one rebuff at the hands of a stripling in command of 160 regulars at Fort Stephenson, teaches a lesson well worth the attention of any statesman or financier.

"Not counting the hastily organized and half-filled regiments of regulars, sent to the West, the records of the Adjutant-General's Office show that about 50,000 militia were called out in 1812 and 1813, from the States of Ohio, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, for service against Proctor's command." (50)

"As further evidence that the keys of the Treasury were turned over to the States with no check, save the honesty of the officers who made out the muster-rolls, it need only be stated that up to April 14, 1813, 'no return of any description' from General Harrison's division of the Army Had ever been received at the Adjutant-General's Office. (51)

"The above facts would seem to offer conclusive proof that THE SAME MISTAKE IN STATESMANSHIP WHICH, IN TIME OF PEACE, GIVES US A NON EXPANSIVE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT, IS CERTAIN TO BRING ABOUT, IN TIME OF WAR, USELESS SACRIFICE OF HUMAN LIFE, UNLIMITED WASTE OF MONEY, AND NATIONAL HUMILIATION." (52)

Military Operations in the Centre (53)


On April 27th a successful attack was made on York, now Toronto, followed by the capture of Fort George by General Dearborn just a month later, and subsequently of all the forts on the Niagara frontier. (54) On May 29th the British under Sir George Prevost (55) attacked the garrison at Sackett's Harbor, N.Y., (56) but were repulsed with heavy loss (57) by the Regulars under Colonel Backus, while General Brown's militia turned tail and ran, despite his efforts. (58)

The retreat of Hampton and Wilkinson from Canada to which allusion will presently be made compelled a withdrawal of the regular garrison from Fort George, the defense of which was left to some New York militia under General McClure. Upon the approach of the British, this inexperienced officer evacuated the place on December 10th, burned the village of Newark (59) and retreated to the American shore, his troops mutinying en route. (60) Although he called out all the militia of the counties of Genesee, Niagara and Chautauqua, the British held these raw levies in such contempt that they determined upon a counter-invasion, crossed the Niagara River to Black Rock on December 19th, captured Fort Niagara "through the criminal negligence of its commander, " and, in revenge for the destruction of Newark, burned Buffalo, Lewistown and several other places, (61) while the militia ran away quite as fast as did the inhabitants. (62)

Military operations in the North.

Shameful as were the fiascos in the central zone, they were insignificant as compared with the fate of the two columns which undertook to invade Canada from the northern frontier. General Hampton with about 5,000 new-recruited regulars (63) started from Lake Champlain, crossed the border, was repulsed at Chateauguay on October 26th by a paltry force of 800 Canadian militia
and Indians, (64) and ignominiously retreated to Plattsburg. General Wilkinson, with 8,000 regulars, (65) assembled at the foot of Lake Ontario and advanced down the St. Lawrence. On November 11th, his advanced-guard, composed of about 1,700 men, encountered 800 British regulars at Chrystler's Fields, and after a fight of two hours, being unable to dislodge the enemy and
having lost 338 men, it fell back to its boats. A council of war then decided to abandon the attack on Montreal, the troops retreated to the American shore and went into winter quarters. (66) In a word, two American columns numbering fully 13,000 and composed for the most part of regulars, faltered and recoiled before an enemy of only 2,000!


"Want of cooperation, superannuated and incompetent commanders, newly enlisted and undisciplined men, inexperienced officers, all the fruits of a bad military policy were the causes of these humiliating defeats.

"The story of Hampton's nerveless campaign affords perhaps the most satisfactory demonstration of THE GREAT IMPORTANCE OF, ONCE AND FOR ALL, DOING AWAY WITH A MILITARY SYSTEM WHICH, AS UNDER THE CONFEDERATION, STILL BASED ITSELF UPON THE SUPPORT AND COOPERATION OF THE STATES." (67) That Massachusetts and Connecticut defied the United States Government by refusing to furnish their militia to its service has already been seen. (68) In Vermont Governor Chittenden, being
bitterly opposed to the war, sought to embarrass the Government by a proclamation, dated November 10, 1813, whereby he commanded a brigade of Vermont militia (69) to return to their homes "within the territorial limits of their own brigade, there to repel if need be, the enemy's invasion, either in co-operation with troops of the United States or separately, as might be necessary," declaring "that, in his opinion, the military strength and resources of the State must be reserved for its own defense and protection exclusively." (70)

Some of the officers refused to be parties to any such attempt to produce insubordination and mutiny, (71) but the governor persisted in his stand and in the following year went even to greater lengths.

Military operations on the Chesapeake.

After two declarations by the British Government of a state of blockade embracing the entire Atlantic coast (72) with the notable exception of Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Rhode Island (73), a fleet under Admiral Cockburn entered the Chesapeake on March 4th and, being joined by Admiral Warren and a force from Bermuda, spent the next two months burning and destroying towns. (74) The inhabitants, to whom more than 66,000 militia afforded no protection, (75) sought to defend their property themselves, but this disregard for the rules of civilized warfare entailed reprisals, until the unhappy people were glad to throw themselves on the mercy of their enemies. In June, Admiral Warren, who had gone back to Bermuda, returned with re-enforcements amounting to 2,650 infantry and marines, attacked Norfolk (76) on the 20th and was repulsed, but captured and destroyed Hampton on the 25th. (77) The remainder of the year the British devoted to maintaining the blockade.

The Creek War.

On August 30th, one thousand Creek warriors surprised Fort Mims in southern Alabama and massacred the garrison. Tennessee promptly authorized the raising of 3,500 volunteers and, on October 11th, 2,500 were concentrated at Huntsville under General Andrew Jackson. A Fortnight later he began his march, and on November 3rd and 9th at Tallasahatchee and Talladega he
inflicted crushing defeats upon the Indians. (78) The war would doubtless have come to a sudden end but a dearth of supplies, "due in large degree to the failure of the Government to properly organize the staff departments, until hostilities with Great Britain became imminent " (79), forced Jackson to withdraw to Fort Strother, where he spent ten days in argument with his hungry
and insubordinate troops. This furnished a very amusing incident; first, the militia mutinied but were suppressed by the volunteers, then the volunteers revolted but were brought to order by the militia, with the aid of the guns. Jackson, realizing that no good could be derived from the volunteers, permitted them to return to Nashville, where they were disbanded; but no sooner was this difficulty overcome than his militia, as well as the 2,000 under General Cocke sent to re-enforce him, again became disaffected and deserted him almost to a man. (80)

Troops employed in 1813

Exclusive of rangers and volunteers, (81) the troops called out in that year amounted to 149,148, only 19,036 being regulars and the rest , 130,112 militia. (82) Of the latter 66,376 from Delaware, Maryland, the District of Columbia, Virginia and North Carolina spent their time in observing the 2,600 regulars and marines on the British fleets, their assistance to the despoiled inhabitants or their resistance to the enemy being virtually nil. As Upton remarks, (83)

"The only compensation for the employment of so many troops during the campaign, was the destruction of Proctor's force of 800 regulars, a feat that would have been impossible, bur doe the victory of Commodore Perry on Lake Erie."

Far from realizing the cherished dream of a conquest of Canada, the second year of this war witnessed the expulsion of the Americans from the enemy's territory, followed by a counter-invasion and the destruction of the towns along the entire Niagara frontier, while farther south the British plundered our coasts at will.

FOOTNOTES (31-83) ON CHAPTER V THE CAMPAIGN OF 1813 Pages: 56-62 (Continue Page: 2)

 

Website: The History Box.com
Article Name: The Military Unpreparedness of the U.S.: The Campaign  of1813
Researcher/Transcriber Miriam Medina

Source:

BIBLIOGRAPHY: From my collection of Books: The Military Unpreparedness of the United States- A History of American Land Forces from Colonial Times until June 1, 1915. By Frederic Louis Huidekoper; Publisher: The Macmillan Company-New York 1916
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