Chapter IV  Pages: 43-52

Washington's solicitude for our national military welfare did not terminate with the Revolution, but even before resigning his commission he thus set forth his views as to a proper peace establishment for the defense of the republic, (1) expressing a belief that;

"due attention will be paid to the importance of placing the militia of the Union upon a regular and respectable footing...It is essential, therefore, that the same system should pervade the whole; that the formation and discipline of the militia of the continent should be absolutely uniform, and that the same species of arms, accoutrements, and military apparatus, should be introduced in every part of the United States. No one, who has not learned it from experience, can conceive the difficulty, expense, and confusion, which result from a contrary system, or the vague arrangements which have hitherto prevailed."

Notwithstanding this sound advice, the moment that independence was an accomplished fact, the States all hastened to arrogate to themselves almost every attribute of sovereignty. In the midst of the most critical period in the history of the United States, when the national credit at home and abroad was completely exhausted and when the country was rapidly drifting into a state of anarchy, Congress saw fit to disband all that remained of the Continental Army except 80 soldiers destined to guard public stores (2) its action being tantamount to a declaration that a Regular Army would be dispensed with at the outset of the republic.(3) Throwing to the winds the lessons of the Revolution, it promptly proceeded to raise a mixed regiment of 700 infantry and artillery drawn from the militia of four States to protect the northwestern frontiers and to garrison the posts about to be evacuated by the British. (4) Within a year, however, the need of a certain amount of regular troops was recognized and a regiment of equal numbers was authorized for the same purpose, the enlistment being for three years. (5) Eighteen months later (6) a further increase was made (7) and the two organizations merged into a "legionary corps" (8) but, although the States were urged to "use their utmost efforts to raise
the quotas of troops respectively assigned them (9) with all possible expedition," their response was so meager that only two companies of artillery were forthcoming.

The pygmy army just created had scarcely got ensconced on the frontiers than Shays' rebellion took place in Massachusetts, and the Government arsenal at Springfield narrowly escaped capture by the malcontents. (10) Eight months later (11) another body of 700 men, enlisted for three years, was raised by resolution of Congress "in order to save the great expense of transporting
new levies to the distant frontiers," "to avail the public of the discipline and knowledge of the country" and in the hope of persuading the soldiers already in service to re-enlist. (12)

The feeble, ineffective and chaotic administration both of civil and military affairs under the existing system of government had produced a general conviction that a change was imperative, and Congress had recommended a convention of delegates from the States in order to revise the Articles of Confederation. (13) This convention met at Philadelphia on May 25, 1787, and on
September 17th the new constitution was signed and submitted to the States for ratification. (14) The preamble recites that among other reasons it was instituted to "insure domestic tranquility" and to "provide for the common defense." Several portions have a direct bearing upon military affairs, (15) and a comparison of the war powers of Congress under the Confederation with those granted by the Constitution will suffice to show how radical was the change effected in the form of government. As Upton very pertinently remarks: (16)

"Up to this time Congress could justly claim that its feeble and exhausting military policy was largely due to the inadequate powers conferred by the Articles of Confederation. Under the Constitution, however, the authority "to raise and support armies,' 'to provide and maintain a navy,' 'to levy and collect taxes,' and 'to borrow money on the credit of the United States' was unqualified and gave every war power that the most despotic ruler could ask.

"Henceforth there could be no division of responsibility between the General Government and the States. If disasters should happen in the future...the whole responsibility must lie at the doors of a President and a Congress clothed with unlimited power to meet every emergency.

"Our liberties and independence, our country's honor and credit were thus all committed to one General Government, IT BEING FULLY EXPECTED by a generous and confiding people THAT EACH REPRESENTATIVE IN THE DISCHARGE OF THIS SACRED TRUST SHOULD REGARD THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AS 'ONE OF THE CARDINAL DUTIES OF A STATESMAN.'"

In consequence of the adoption and ratification of the Constitution, the military as well as the civil affairs required an extensive overhauling, and the first act of importance pertaining to the former (17) created a War Department, presided over by a Secretary of War who was made responsible to the President instead of to Congress. (18) The Act of September 29, 1789, laid the foundations of our present Army by recognizing "the establishment for the troops in the service of the United States," by requiring all officers and men to take an oath of allegiance and by vesting the power to appoint officers in the President alone. (19) By virtue of the fifth section the President was authorized, whenever it might be necessary to protect the frontiers against Indians, to call into service such militia as he should deem necessary, such militia when in service to have the same pay and subsistence as the Regulars, a procedure which furnishes the key to our entire policy in respect to subsequent hostilities with the Indians. (20)

The first general organization of the Army under Constitution was effected by the Act of April 30, 1790, which fixed the strength of the Regular establishment at one regiment of infantry and one battalion of artillery, (21) but no provision was made for a General Staff beyond permitting the President in his discretion to appoint one or two inspectors. General Harmar's expedition against the Miamis again demonstrated the folly of depending upon newly-formed militia (22) and forced Congress to add another regiment of regulars to be enlisted for three years. (23) By virtue of the 8th section of this Act, the President was empowered to employ, "for a term not exceeding six months," a corps of 2,000 non-commissioned officers, privates and musicians in addition to, or in place of, the militia and, if such a corps should not be raised in time for active operations, to make good the deficiency by raising additional levies or by calling into service an equal number of militia; (24) while the 9th section authorized him "to organize the said levies, and alone to appoint the commissioned officers thereof, in the manner he may judge proper." (25) As Upton points out: (26)

"The above legislation merits our closest scrutiny. Here was laid the foundation of the volunteer system, which attained its fullest development during our long civil war. The 'levies,' known later as 'volunteers,' were authorized under the plenary power of Congress to 'raise and support armies,' and the power of appointing their officers was given the President, to whom it obviously belonged, as the 'levies' were wholly distinct from the militia or State troops.

"The subsequent transfer of this power from the President to the governors of the States (27) was a voluntary return to the practice under the Confederation and a surrender of the prerogatives of the General Government under the Constitution."

The disastrous route of General St. Clair's expedition (28) furnished another proof that the lessons which ought to have been taught by the Revolution and by Harmar's defeat had been wasted upon the Government, but it had the salutary effect of inducing Congress to complement the artillery and infantry then in service to their maximum strength and to add three new regiments
of infantry, (29) thus bringing the strength of the Army up to 258 officers and 5,156 men. (30) During the succeeding twenty years the legislative enactments, depending largely upon our foreign relations and upon troubles with the Indians, caused the size of the Regular forces to vary greatly, as will be seen from the following table:

STRENGTH OF THE REGULAR ARMY AS AUTHORIZED BY CONGRESS (31)

Date 1792 to 1796 1796 to 1798 1798 1799 1800 to 1801 1802 to 1808 1808 to 1812

Officers 258 233 783 2,447 318 241 774

Men 5,156 3,126 13,638 49,244 4,118 3,046 9,147

Total 5,414 (32) 3,359 (33) 14,421 (34) 51,691 (35) 4,436 (36) 3,287 (37) 9,921 (38)

The various acts of Congress affecting the military and militia establishments are too numerous and complex to require insertion here, but a few of them are of sufficient importance to demand a cursory examination.

The diminutive size and temporary character of the military force created by the early American legislators demonstrate that their intention was to dispense with a standing army entirely; but as time wore on Shays' rebellion, the Whiskey rebellion, the continual trouble with the Indians and the complications with France, Spain and England, engendered a universal belief that national defense must not be disregarded. After considerable discussion, Congress inclined to its usual favorite and sought to appease public opinion by the organic law of May 8, 1792, entitled "An act more effectually to provide for the national defense, by establishing an
uniform militia throughout the United States." The opening section of this law prescribed that all able-bodied white men between the ages of 18 and 45 shall be enrolled in the militia, with the obligation to provide themselves with certain specified arms and accoutrements, as well as to appear equipped therewith when called out for duty or drill. (39) Section 2 exempted certain
persons from military duty, (40) and Section 3 indicated the proper military organization and ventured the suggestion as to the composition of each brigade, "if the same be convenient," to the States, (41) while fourth section required at least one company of artillery and a troop of horse, exacting that all officers, privates and troops furnish their own arms and equipment as well as all necessary mounts for the cavalry and infantry. (42) A mere glance at the military edifice erected by this law shows that it was founded upon the sands, and that Congress thus substantially handed over its war powers to the States, placing itself at their mercy as completely as during the darkest days of the Revolution. An admirable analysis of this far-reaching measure is thus given by Upton: (43)

"During the Revolution the Government shifted upon the States the responsibility of providing men, arms, and even daily supplies for the troops; but under the provisions of this law the Government and States went one step further, and shifted upon individual citizens the responsibility of providing their own arms, horses and equipments. No penalty was enacted for a failure to procure such supplies, Congress having no power to enforce it, and the States were therefore left to apply such penalties by way of fines as their legislatures might see fit to impose. Even had the citizen been willing to furnish at his own cost that which it was the unmistakable duty of the Government to provide, the further execution of the law depended wholly on the voluntary and concurrent action of the States, without which 'uniform militia throughout the United States' would be impossible....

"Aside, however, from the military defects of the system, it is only when we examine it from the standpoint of the taxpayer that its fundamental errors become fully apparent. For one National Army were substituted thirteen or more State armies. In place of having a small but efficient force of regulars, supported by indirect taxation, the citizens of each State were called upon to pay over their hard-earned dollars to maintain undisciplined bodies of militia, totally ignorant of the first principles of the military art. Even had all the States with patriotic regard for the welfare of the whole country maintained their quotas of militia during the long intervals of peace, they would have been at the expense of a large military force for the benefit of the General Government, and that, too, without compensation except in time of war. If, on the contrary, as has since happened, certain States should fail to keep up a militia, the burden of their shortcomings would be unjustly borne by the remainder.

"View it in whatever light we may, the conversion of the militia into an army of the first line, as designated by the law, was a wild and impracticable scheme." (44)

In 1798 (45) the serious complications with England and France, especially the latter, caused an increase in the Corps of Artillerists and Engineers, (46) an appropriation of $1,200,000 was made for fortifications, arms and munitions of war, (47) and an authorization to the President "in the event of a declaration of war against the United States, or of our imminent danger of
such invasion....to raise a force of 10,000 noncommissioned officers and men, to be enlisted for the period of three years." (48) Washington was appointed commander-in-chief with the rank of Lieutenant-General but, although this army was never called into service, it is manifest that the intention was to eliminate the militia, to place all dependence upon regulars and volunteers
and, so far as the former were concerned, not to repeat the blunder of short enlistments. (49)

Ten months had not elapsed before Congress, still in dread of war, sanctioned (50) a large increase in the military establishment, (51) authorized the President to accept the services of 75,000 volunteers, with power to organize them into regiments, brigades and divisions, as well as to appoint all necessary officers. Then having done an excellent piece of work, Congress proceeded to nullify a large measure of it by inserting a fatal proviso that "the said volunteers shall not be compelled to serve out of the State in which they reside, or for a longer time than three months after their arrival at the place of rendezvous." On the other hand, it incorporated a section authorizing the President to make use of these volunteers in all cases where he was empowered to call out the militia. (52)

"Thus, in addition to the Regular Army, the military legislation of that period, profiting by our Revolutionary experience, had provided a body of national volunteers, offered by the President, to take the place of the State militia troops. Had this organization come down to the beginning of our late war, (53) or even had the companies only been raised by the State authorities, leaving it to the President to organize them into battalions and regiments with a professional soldier at the head of each, (54) it is more than probable that in one-half the time 300,000 men would have done the work finally accomplished by little less than 3,000,000."
(55)

The complications with France having been adjusted with-out war, the additional force was disbanded by the Act of May 14, 1800. (56)

During this entire period, by far the most important measure was the Act of March 16, 1802, in which the reiterated urgings of Washington, Hamilton, Knox and Pickering were heeded by the creation of a Military Academy at West Point, (57) and second in its beneficial effects was that of April 29, 1812, increasing the number of cadets to 250, (58) thus vitalizing it (59) and enabling it to furnish most of the officers needed by the Army in time of peace.

From 1802 to 1808, all Congressional measures, whether offensive or defensive, were directed toward the almost exclusive use of the militia and volunteers. The advent of Thomas Jefferson, who was thoroughly imbued with democratic ideas and to whom anything that smacked of a dominant central Government or the augmentation of its existing powers was strongly repugnant, (60)
doubtless exercised its influence. Indeed, in his first annual message to Congress, (61) he deprecated the superfluous size of the army (62) and its maintenance in time of peace as a defense against invasion in war, declaring that the only dependable force is "the body of neighboring citizens as formed into a militia" (63) and emphasizing the necessity of rectifying the militia laws "until they are sufficiently perfect." (64) Throughout his utterances as President is the underlying principle of dependence upon a citizen-soldiery, (65) which he suggested should be raised to the number of 300,000 (66) and classified. (67) As the founder and leader of democracy in America, his views are of special significance, doubly so since they have persisted to a greater or less degree until today. (68) It is therefore particularly interesting to see the reversal of opinion on his part in subsequent years when his doctrines as to national defense were put to the test of war. (69)

Within thirteen months of Jefferson's first inauguration the army was further reduced and re-organized, (70) and one year later, when war was impending with Spain, no attempt was made to increase it, but the President was authorized to require such State governors as he selected "to hold in readiness to march at a moment's notice a detachment of 80,000, officers included." (71)
The third section of this law remanded the appointment of volunteer officers to the States and, most unfortunately for our military welfare, became the basis of the system used throughout the Mexican War and the War of the Rebellion. (72) In 1807 there were unmistakable evidences that a war with England was brewing, but again resort was had to volunteers limited to twelve months'
service, (73) with the proviso that all militia which volunteered as organizations "shall continue to be commanded by the officers holding commissions in the same (74) at the time of such tender." The indications of war becoming stronger in the spring of 1808, an increase was at last made in the Regular Army (75) to an authorized strength of 9,921, but two years later, when the war was recognized to be unavoidable, Congress remained supine, and it was not until the end of 1811 that further action was taken in the shape of a bounty of $16 to all new recruits enlisting for five years or former soldiers re-enlisting for the same term. (76) At the
beginning of 1812, on the eve of war, a succession of six acts sought too late to raise the necessary forces (77) and to effect the organization which can only be done in time of profound peace. Short enlistments were again resorted to, and the distressing fact became apparent that, after twenty-five years of independence, the nation was about to embark upon a war against a great Power with officers scarcely more efficient than those who led the Continental Army at the beginning of the Revolution. The outbreak of hostilities found the entire military establishment in the utmost chaos, and no better evidence of the confusion that is inevitable at the commencement of war, just so long as Congress in time of peace neglects to make suitable provision for national defense, could be adduced than the military legislation of this period. (78)

Footnotes On Chapter IV (Continue On Page 2)