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Panics, Depressions and Economic Crisis Prior to 1930
 
The Panic of 1819
 
Panic and Depression 1832

Panic and Depression 1836

The Panic of 1837

Six Year Depression 1837-1843

The Panic of 1857

Panic and Depression 1869-1871

The Panic of 1873

The Panic of 1893-Financial World

The Panic of 1893-Presidential Papers

The Panic of 1901-Market Fails, Panic Reigns-Part I

The Panic of 1901-Market Fails, Panic Reigns-Part II

The Panic of 1901- At The Stock Exchange

Panic and Depression of 1929

Brief Financial Notes based on 1875-1907

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The Big Apple is a term coined by musicians meaning to play the big time
 

 

 

 

and timber fall steadily, while the stock market fluctuates wildly. Many financiers, including August Belmont, J.P. Morgan and Henry Villard, warn Cleveland that a panic is nearing, and add their pressure to get a repeal of the Sherman Silver Purchase Act of 1890, which they blame for the crisis.
 
 The chief fear among Eastern financiers and businessmen is that in a panic the United States could easily be forced off the gold standard. Early in May the panic begins. More railroads go broke; many of the great financial trusts begin to collapse; European banks begin selling their American stocks and bonds, and a huge run on banks ensues, until more than 500 Banks have failed. A vigorous battle begins, with the goal of repealing the Sherman Act. Forces for and against repeal are lined up geographically: the West and South favor retention of the act, and the East favors immediate repeal. Despite the repeal of the act in October, the deepening depression is becoming worldwide, and is wiping out prosperity in all sections of the economy.
 
 1The Financial World
 
 The events of the past week will pass into Wall Street history as the "industrial panic." As a panic it was the worst since 1873, and the full force of it fell on the industrial stocks. It fell upon them because the speculation was concentrated in that group, and it did not touch the railroad shares with any severity because so little has been doing in them as compared with the industrials. One railroad stock there had been an inflated speculation in, and it suffered as much as the industrials, Manhattan. The time of extreme stress lasted over three days. It reached its most acute stage on Friday morning, when for nearly two hours it seemed as if the whole Street would go down in a crash of bankruptcy similar to 1873.
 
 By noon the worst was over; by the afternoon there had been a rebound of prices almost as great as the morning fall: and three o'clock struck the excited throngs of brokers on the floor of the Exchange gave vent to a wild cheer, thankful that the trying day was over. Yesterday the market was feverish and from feverishness it is likely to quiet down into a weak dullness, like a patient who has been exhausted by violent spasms. It is unnecessary to note here the extreme declines, or the rapid recoveries in prices. They have already been set forth minutely and at length. But it may be said that to see the like, one must go back twenty years: and in those days it was all railroad stocks. There were no others to speculate in.
 
 The fact that they were railroad stocks, and not industrials, did not secure them against the effects of excessive speculation; neither because this panic, of 1893, has taken place in the industrials, does it follow that industrial stocks are of less value than railroad stocks. When a period of financial or commercial stress comes upon us, whatever speculation has been the most active in suffers the most in the general collapse. 
 
 This is equally true of securities or commodities, or of any group of securities. We have seen (not to go back to the old days of gold speculation) some terrible days in Wall Street when the trunk line stocks were the storm centers, when the Gould securities were, and Atchison and Union Pacific, and notably when the group of stocks known as the Velars wrought wreck and ruin. It was these latter which gave Wall Street its last bad time previous to the past week. Then there were no industrials, for those stocks were at the time few in number and but little traded in. They, therefore, were not responsible.
 
 This time they are. Why? A few figures will show. The first of the industrial group which the speculative public took a fancy to was American Refineries stock, called, for short, Sugar. It took the popular fancy, because the company made large profits and paid big dividends. Speculation in it became a craze, and then followed in rapid succession the formation of other large companies and the listing of their stocks on the Exchange. Since first Sugar became prominent in public speculation, we have had listed the securities of nine or ten companies with capital stocks varying from $35,000,000 to $8,000,000. 
 
 Here is a brief enumeration of all, the capital given being the combined common and preferred stocks of each: Sugar, $73,000,000; Cotton Oil, (reorganized,) $30,000,000; Distilling, $35,000,000; Tobacco, $29,000,000; General Electric, $34,000,000; Cordage, $25,000,000; Lead, $30,000,000; Linseed Oil, $18,000,000; Rubber, $26,000,000; Starch, $8,000,000. The total foots up nearly $310,000,000, all the creation of a few years. In addition these companies have bonds to the amount of about $35,000,000. Here, then, is a mass of $310,000,000 of stocks, of recent creation, in which public speculation has been extremely active, so much so as to leave the old railroad favorites of speculation quite in the shade, but which have not as yet found a settled standing among the financial community.
 
 
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