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4. The government and particularly the Federal
Reserve Board, had not checked credit inflation or
imposed any sort of other restraints to keep inflation
from getting out of control. It had not taken a
realistic attitude toward the problems of agriculture,
world trade, or labor, could begin again; that there
should be economy in all branches of the government; and
that expenditures for relief should come from sales
taxes. The basic industries continued to reduce their
labor forces and to pay dividends out of accumulated
surpluses. Eighty-three corporations increased dividends
on common stock a total of 5.9 percent during the first
year of the depression although their earnings decreased
19.8 percent during the same period. Many
corporations continued to pay the usual dividend rates
after their earnings dropped to zero; and, at the same
time, they were making wage cuts, laying off men, and
reducing others to part time. Wages dropped 60 percent
in three years. President Hoover made repeated appeals
to prevent wage-cutting and the discharge of employees
by industry, but to no avail. He held a series of
conferences at Washington where he insisted that the
shock of the depression ought to fall upon profits
instead of wages, and that there ought to be no wage
cuts if they could possibly be avoided. Industry,
however, refused to act upon the principle that recovery
depended upon restoration of the purchasing power of the
masses.
The Administration, also, probably in the belief that
the depression would be of short duration, approached
the problem of the unemployed from the viewpoint of
relief rather than restoration of purchasing power,. It,
therefore, refused to countenance the use of federal
funds for relief purposes. Only at the end of his
administration did President Hoover agree to loans of
federal funds to states whose resources had been
exhausted by the burden of caring for the unemployed.
His approach was the indirect one of revitalizing
industry so people could go back to work, instead of
increasing purchasing power so industry could resume
production. More than $2,000,000,000 was appropriated
for public works, including the Boulder Dam project on
the Colorado River; but the two chief measures of the
administration program were the creation of the
Reconstruction Finance
Corporation and the Home Owners Loan Banks.
The Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act passed
Congress in January, 1932. It created a corporation
under a board of seven directors, including the
Secretary of the Treasury, the Governor of the Federal
Reserve Board, and the Farm Loan Commissioner. It was
capitalized at $500,000,000 and was authorized to sell a
maximum of $1,500,000,000 worth of five-year notes or
bonds to the public or to the Treasury of the United
States. Regional offices were established for the
purpose of making loans. These loans could be made
directly to banks and railroads, to agriculture through
the Department of Agriculture, and to industry by
acceptance of bills of exchange. Loans were limited to
five years and to a maximum of $100,000,000. Not even
Congress was to be allowed information as to what loans
were made, except the aggregate amount in each class and
state. In July, 1932, the capital funds of the
corporation were increased to $3,800,000,000;
$500,000,000 for initial capital, $1,500,000,000 for
loans to corporations, the same amount for construction
loans on self-liquidating projects, and $300,000,000 for
relief loans to states.
The Home Loan Bank Act of July, 1932, established a
system of Home Loan Banks to discount home mortgages
held by building and loan associations, savings banks,
and insurance companies. The primary purpose of the Act
was to rescue the banks. The Reconstruction Finance
Corporation, during the first year of its existence,
loaned $1,000,000,000 to banks. Nothing, however, seemed
able to stop the trend toward a bank panic. Withdrawals
continued, bankers refused to borrow and lend, and
confidence was not restored. It became increasingly
evident that the banks must close and in financial
circles, that the gold standard would have to be
abandoned. The banking crisis came at the close of
Hoover's administration. Nearly 7000 had closed in the
previous eight years, more than 2000 of them in 1931,
and the entire structure was shaky. Banks were
temporarily closed by governors' proclamations in Nevada
in January, and in Louisiana in February, 1933. Governor
Comstock of Michigan closed the banks of that state on
February 14. By March 1, the holiday had been extended
to more than half the states and three days later was
decided upon in New York City. Almost the entire country
was without banking facilities and without currency. On
March 5, President Roosevelt by proclamation closed
every bank in the country and ordered all movements of
gold and silver stopped. That date marked the bottom of
the depression.
[END OF ARTICLE]
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